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HomeMy WebLinkAboutSP August 26, 1987 DATE: Auqust 26, 1987 i~ ITEMS GIVEN TO THE CITY COUNCIL Hay,Lawsui t \-' .,:. "~':; ,..~_. : : I'" -: PLEASE ADDRESS THESE ITEMS AT THIS MEETING OR PUT THEM ON THE NEXT AGENDA. THANK YOU. ~:. J ,- --' LAW OFFICES OF Burke aud Jlawkius SUITE '01 299 COON RAPIDS BOULEVARD COON RAPIDS. MINNESOTA S5433 PHONE (612) 784-2998 JOHN M. BURKE WILLlAM~. HAWKINS BARRY M. ROBINSON ;i rCE'VEn l\G~~~;987lJ 10 ce. S/~/t) 13 August 19&7 CITY OF ".NDOVF.R Andover City Hall 1685 Crosstown Blvd. Andover, MN 55304 Attention: James E. Schrantz Administrator In Re: Bay Lawsuit Dear Jim: Enclosed prease find the Anoka County District Court Order in regard to the Summary Judgment Motion that was filed on behalf of the City. The purpose of the Summary Judgment Motion was to try:and get all of the Hay lawsuit dismissed. We did not expect that the City would be dismissed since the Summary JUdgment Motion can only be granted if there are no factual disputes. Since there are a number of factual disputes, the Court did not grant Summary Judgment concerning the City as a defendant. However, the Court did dismiss all of the individual Council members from the lawsuit. The Order is enclosed. Please distribute same to all of the City Council members. If they have any questions, please have them contact me. kr;~e;)' ~G. Hawkins WGH:d'A '. AUb .>1::li:l7 STATE OF MINNESOTA COUNTY OF ANOKA DISTRICT COURT TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT rSue Halvorson Attorney at:.Law 1221 Micollet Mall Suite 700 Minneapolis, MN 55403 L -, CLERK I S NOn CE f ...J r I George C. Hoff Attorney at Law 250 Suburban Nationp.l Bank Building 300 Prairie Center Drive &len Prairie, MN 55344-5381 ....J RE: Anoka District CourtFile C7-86-2739 Bruce B. Hay et al VB. City of Andover.et al You are hereby notified that on July 31, 1987 ~ Order (copy enclosed) was duly filed in the above-entitled matter. Dated: 8/4/87 .JANE F. MORROW Court Administrator Anoka County, Minnesota By LS Deputy 425-REV-7-85 AUG 5 198i STATE OF MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF AHOKA Bruce B. Hay, Bernell Hay, Steven Johnson, Linda Johnson, Lesley Barnes, John O. Barnes, and Round Lake Development Corporation, Plaintiffs, ORDER vs. City of Andover, Jerry Windschitl as Mayor of Andover, the City Council of Andover and its council members, Jim Elling, Michael Knight, Ted Lachinski, and Ken Ortell, Court File No. C7-86-2739 Defendants. r 'The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on July 16, 1987 before the undersigned-JUdge of District Court on motion by defendant for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for Minnesota District Courts. Sue Halvorson, Esq., of Hart, Bruner, O'Brien &: 'Thorton, P.A., 1221 Nicollet Mall, Suite 700, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55403, appeared on behalf of plaintiffs. George C. Hoff, Esq., of Hoff &: Allen, 250 Suburban National Bank Building, 300 Prairie Center Drive, Eden Prairie, Minnesota 55344-5381,_ appeared on behalf of defendants. Based upon the arguments and memoranda of counsel and all the files, records and proceedings herein, the Court makes the following: ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: I. That individual defendants' motion for summary judgment on the claims against the individual defendants is granted. 2. That defendant City of Andover's motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's complaint against City of Andover Is denied. Dated this :3 {S1ay of July, 1987. BY THE COURT: ~-O,cO:L- Lynn ~. Olson Judge of District Court Tenth Judicial District - Let the attached Memorandum be made a part of this Order. r -2- MEMORANDUM Plaintiffs herein brought suit against the City of Andover and other named defendants claiming that the actions of these parties have interfered with and effectively denied plaintiffs' constitutionally protected property rights in a special use permit. 1. BACKGROUND AND FACTS The present case has a rather complicated history which, for our purposes, begins in April 1970 when Plaintiff Hay first applied to the Township of Grow for a special use permit to construct and operate a mobile home park. In January 1971, the application was denied solely on the basis that the Town Board had previously granted a mobile home park permit to another property owner whose application was submitted after Hay's. Haybfought suit in Anoka County District Court to compel the issuance of the special use permit. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Hay, concluding . that "the action of the defendants in refusing the special use permit application of the plaintiffs. .. was discriminatory, arbitrary and capricious." (See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Judgment by the Honorable Leonard Keyes dated August 11, 1971). On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed and held that the Township's denial of Hay's application "was not only arbitrary but also impermissibly discriminatory, contravening the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 2 and Article 4, Sections 33 and 34 of the Minnesota Constitution." Hay v. Township of Grow, 296 Minn. 1, 206 N. W.2d 19, 23 (1973). In September 1973, Hay appeared before the Grow.Township Board seeking a variance to allow construction of a.mobile home park with an underground sewer system under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health. Hay was required to make a formal application for a variance and to appear personally at the Planning Commission meeting, and, thereafter, in January 1974, the Planning Commission considered Hay's request for a variance. Hay presented evidence demonstrating the feasibility of his proposed system and the health and safety precautions inherent in Health Department oversight. The Planning Commission recommended denial of the variance. In February 1974, the Township Board, relying upon the Planning Commission's recommendation, denied the variance request. The Minnesota Supreme Court opinion holding unconstitutional the Township's denial of the special use permit to Hay was rendered on March 26, 1973; however, the Township only issued the permit on August 19, 1974. The Town Board. then imposed conditions on the permit, among which are the following: 1. All sanitary sewer and water lines within the ... development site shall be constructed by grantee at his own expense. . ' 2. No certificate of occupancy relating to any mobile home site shall be issued unless said site or unit is provided with municipal sanitary sewer service. In no event shall on-site sewage disposal systems be allowed. 3. If construction is not commenced within two years following the availability of municipal sanitary sewer service, this permit shall be null and void. .. The ori~inal date of availability shall be determined by the Township En~ineer. (Emphasis added). There was no municipal sanitary sewer service in that area of Grow Township. In November 1974, the Township of Grow was incorporated as the City of Andover. A Comprehensive Plan for Sanitary Sewer and Water Facilities was prepared by the City's consulting engineer, Toltz, King, Duvall, Anderson & Associates, Inc. (hereinafter "TKDA"). This report identified an Urban Planning Area (hereinafter "UPA") and suggested that sanitary sewer service could be provided in the UPA using the available capacity of the Coon Rapids Interceptor. Hay's property was within the -2- UPA. Apparently, the Coon Rapids Interceptor had already been constructed to the south border of Andover. In June, 1976, the Comprehensive Sanitary Sewer Plan was revised by TKDA "to conform to Met Council policy plan for sanitary sewers" under the land use Planning Act, Minn. Stat. S 473.851 et. seq. TKDA again reported that sanitary sewer service could be provided to the UP A through the Coon Rapids Interceptor. Again, Hay's property was within the UPA. The 1976 Plan also considered an alternate proposed system, the CAB Interceptor, to serve a portion of Andover. However, the report recommended a master plan, which included Hay's property, within an urban service area (hereinafter "MUSA"). In spring of 1980, the City Council decided to revise the boundaries of the MUSA which decision was reviewed at a meeting on March 18, 1980. At the meeting the mayor also inrtiated a review of the history relative to Hay's proposed trailer park, and noted that the chances of the western portion of the City getting service from the CAB Interceptor in the foreseeable future "is very remote." In response to comments from the public, the mayor stated that "if and when sewer and water is available" the City would not be able to discriminate in providing utilities to the "trailer park." The City Attorney also noted that "the City can do nothing to stop the trailer park if and when sewer is available." After further comment by members of the public, Mayor Windschitl stated that "he too has serious concerns over a mobile home park within the City. . . ." At that same meeting one of the Councilmen pointed out that tithe City has had the potential to hook up to 32,000 units and has had that potential since 1975, but has not done it." After these discussions, the Council members passed a motion excluding Hay's property from the Coon Rapids Interceptor Area and placing it within the CAB area, the area where service in the foreseeable future is "very remote." -3- Following this MUSA change which excluded Hay's property from the Coon Rapids Interceptor area, TKDA, in a letter to the mayor and the City Council dated March 31, 1980, recommended against the MUSA boundary change. On April 24, 1980 at a special City Council rezoning meeting, Hay and his attorney requested sewer service for the special use property. Nevertheless, a rezoning proposal was drafted shortly thereafter which had the effect of excluding Hay's property from the MUSA. On June 23, 1980, the City Council approved the revised MUSA boundaries. On October 20, 1980 the City submitted its Comprehensive Plan to the Metropolitan Council. The Met Council, pursuant to its authority under Minn. Stat. S 473.175, requested that the City reduce the acreage in its pre-1990 MUSA. - Apparently, the City had great flexibility to amend the MUSA if development should occur outside the pre-1990 MUSA. At the April 7, 1981, City Council meeting, Hay and his attorney again requested sewer service. The matter was tabled by the City Council pending an engineering report on the feasibility of sewer service to the property. Although the mayor asserted at that meeting that the decision to place the special use permit property in the CAB area was made on the basis of gravity flow, the minutes of that meeting reflect disagreement as to whether studies had been done relative to gravity flow in that area. TKDA prepared a feasibility study of extending gravity service to Hay's property which recommended against the inclusion of Hay's property within the Coon Rapids Interceptor because of difficulty of gravity service to a portion of the area (thus necessitating lift stations), minimal lateral benefits and frost protection concerns and because extension of service was inconsistent with the adopted and approved Comprehensive Sanitary Sewer Plan and the approved Comprehensive Plan for the City of Andover. TKDA's report stated that the cost of over $100,000 to -4- extend the sewer was not "a reasonable and logical extension to the Coon Rapids Interceptor. " Council meeting, Hay offered to extend the sewer service entirely at his own expense. Subsequent to denying Hay sewer, the City thereafter extended municipal sewer service to several other parcels of property outside the MUSA. Plaintiff However, by letter dated March 18, 1981, and again at the April '1, 1981, enumerates several instances where the City extended sewer service to parcels without amending the MUSA or trading acreage. Plaintiff contends that Defendants Elling and Knight were councilmembers when these unauthorized "expansions" of the MUSA were approved. Based upon this lengthy history, plaintiffs commenced the instant action. n. ANALYSIS ,. Summary Judgment Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. The moving party has the burden of proof and the non-moving party has the benefit of that view of the evidence which is most favorable to him. Seafirst Commercial Corp. v. Speakman, 384 N. W.2d 895 (Minn. Ct. App.1986). All doubts and factual inferences must be resolved against the moving party. Id. The court's function is not to decide issues of fact, but to determine whether there are fact issues to be tried. Id. Qualified Immunity Dismissed of Individual Defendants In the first instance the City asserts that the individual defendants should be dismissed from the suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields certain officials from liability in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1982). Under the standard set forth in Harlow v. -5- Fitz~erald, 475 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982), "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.n The rationale of the qualified immunity defense is that public officials with a broad range of duties and responsibilities must be able to execute those responsibilities without undue risk of civil liability. In Harlow, the Court explained: If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be sustained. But again, the defense would turn primarily on objective factors. Id. at 818-19, lO~ S.Ct. at 2739 Thus, if the trial judge determines that the law was not clearly established at the time the conduct occurred, the inquiry ceases. At that point, the official is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738-39. In Hebson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 26-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the Court established a step by step process as follows: [ A ]ssume plaintiff alleges that defendant violated Right X, and defendant moves for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, claiming Right X was not well- established when the alleged acts were committed and, alternatively, that extraordinary circumstances prevented him both from knowing and having reason to know the relevant legal standard. If the district court judge determines as a matter of law that Right X was well- established, a question of fact might still remain as to whether defendant reasonably neither knew nor should have known of it. The first issue is purely legal and should be susceptible to initial determination on the complaint and summary judgment papers. The latter is potentially an issue for trial, depending upon the unique circumstances of each case. -6- Accordingly, the first question before the Court is whether or not the right plaintiffs assert was well established or whether, alternatively, extraordinary circumstances preventing "defendants from knowing the relevant legal standard. The Court agrees that plaintiffs' constitutional right to a special use permit was expressly spelled out by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Hay v. Township of Grow. In this case, however, plaintiffs were granted a special use permit. Hence the question becomes whether defendant's continuing requirement that municipal sewer service be connected before plaintiff develop the mobile park, coupled with the City's denial of municipal sewer connection, in effect violated plaintiffs' constitutional right to the special use permit. The entire controversy in the instant action rests upon a determination of whether defendants' actions with respect to the availability of municipal sewer service to plaintiff Hay had a rational basis, as defendants contend, or whether such actions were, as plaintiffs contend, a deliberate effort to frustrate the special use permit. It is well settled that applicants for permits state substantive due process claims if they allege the governing authorities capriciously and arbitrarily imposed an unconstitutional condition on the granting of a permit. See, Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1986). However, to say that a due process claim exists is not the same as saying that a clear violation of well-established law exists. Viewing the circumstances of the present case, the Court cannot find here the clarity required by the Harlow standard. Absent such clarity, the Court believes it is compelled to grant summary judgment to the individual defendants. City of Andover Substantive Due Process Claims and Equal Protection Plaintiffs also claim that defendants' arbitrary and capricious actions have denied plaintiffs' constitutional rights to substantive due process and equal protection. -7- Plaintiffs entitlement to a special use permit for development of a mobile home park was declared by the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in 1973. As previously indicated, a claim that governmental authorities arbitrarily imposed an unconstitutional condition on a permit states a substantive due process claim. See, Cunnin~ham v. City of Overland, 804 F.2d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 1966). Subsequent to this Court's decision in Hay v. Township of Grow, defendant City did grant a special use permit, however one which conditioned the development of the park upon the extension of municipal serves service to the park. Thereafter, plaintiffs were unable to obtain the required sewer service based upon the City's decisions relative to that matter. Plaintiffs have presented an ample factual record of events and actions whereby reasonable persons could differ as to whether or not defendant City's actions had a rational basis or whether in fact, such actions were, as plaintiffs claim, arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory. Defendants have denied a variance. They have rezoned the lines for sewer service, denied sewer connection, and refused to amend the MUSA line for plaintiffs. Yet defendants have allowed MUSA amendment and sewer extension to others. Based on this record the Court concludes that genuine issues of material fact are presented and defendant City of Andover's motion for summary judgment as to the City of Andover is denied. Constitutional Taking Claim Defendants also seek summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims that the actions of the City constitute a taking of their property without compensation. The Courts have consistently held that where government activity causes a definite and measurable decrease in the value of plaintiffs' property and interferes with the current practical enjoyment of the property, a compensable taking has occurred. McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N. W.2d 253 (Minn. 1980). However, the right to use property as one wishes is subject to and limited by the proper exercise of -8- " the police power in the regulation of land use, and such regulation does not constitute 8 compensable taking unless it deprives the property of all reasonable use. Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114,71 L.Ed. 303 (l926). Defendant City argues that summary judgment is warranted as to the taking claims because Hay, in fact, has not been deprived of all use of his property. According to defendant, the property is zoned to allow for development of single family residences. However, the Court finds that questions have been raised as to whether the City of Andover in fact properly exercised its police power. If at trial it is determined that the City's police power was improperly exercised, such improper exercise may have resulted in a taking. Thus, genuine issues of material fact are presented in this case which obviate the granting of summary judgment. Laches Defendant City further seeks summary judgment on the ground that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. In order to prove laches, the person asserting the defense must show inexcusable delay in asserting a right and that the delay caused undue prejudice to the party asserting laches. City of St. Paul v. Hardin~, 356 N. W.2d 319 (Minn. App. 1984). The Court agrees with plaintiff that the doctrine of laches is not applicable in the present case. Plaintiffs base their claim, not upon a single decision, but rather upon an alleged repeated and continuing series of decisions made by defendants, up to and including decisions made in 1986. Based upon these allegations of continuing illegal conduct, the Court concludes that plaintiffs are not barred by laches. Standing Defendants also challenge plaintiffs' standing to raise the issue of low income housing. In Worth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197 (l975), the Supreme -9- Court reviewed the constitutional limitations and considerations that guide a court in determining a party's standing. The essence of the standing question is "whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' [ as] to warrant his invocation of. . . jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf." Id., at 498-499, 95 S.Ct. at 2205, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204,82 S.Ct. 691, 703 (1962). The plaintiff must show that he himself is injured by the challenged action of the defendant. The injury may be indirect. See, United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 2416 (1973). But, the complaint must indicate that the injury is indeed fairly traceable to the defendant's acts or omissions. Simon v. Eastern Ky Welfare Rilrhts Orlr., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42,96 S.Ct. 1917, 1925-26 (1976). The Court believes that Villalre of Arlinlrton Heijrhts v. Metropolitan Housinlr Development Corporation et. al., 97 S.Ct. 555 (1977), a case similar in some respects to this one, provides the governing law. In Arlinlrton Heilrhts, the Court held that a real estate developer, which had contracted to purchase a tract of land in order to build racially integrated low and moderate income housing, met constitutional standing requirements in its suit charging local authorities of racial discrimination for refusing to rezone the tract. Id., at , 97 S.Ct. 561. The Court specifically found the real estate developer had shown an injury to itself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. ~ at , 97 S.Ct. 561. This is precisely the situation presented here. In light of the standard established in Arling-ton HeiJrhts, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have met the constitutional requirements and therefore have standing to assert its own rights respecting the issue of low income housing. -10- o o CITY of ANDOVER SPECIAL CITY COUNCIL MEETING - AUGUST 26, 1987 - AGENDA 7:00 P.M. Planning Commission Interviews 1. Harold Sullivan 2. Rebecca L. Pease 7:30 P.M. 1. Call to Order 2. Fire Station Report 3. Police Department Report 4. City Hall Report 5. Animal Control Contract 6. Purchase/Lease Copy Machine, Postage Meter, Telephone System 7. Special Assessment Manual 8. Assessment Policy/Cost for Curb & Gutter/County .Urban Streets 9. Joint Powers Agreement/Crosstown/139th Ave. to Coon Creek 10. HRA Bylavls 11. 12. Adjournment Future Items Dehn's Streets MSA Designation/university Ave. North of l57th & Crosstown Anoka Drainage Agreement/Dehn's Ordinance 8 & 10 Personnel Items: Compensation Plan: Paternity/Maternity Policy: Eng. Technician Reclassification o c CITY OF ANDOVER REQUEST FOR COUNCIL ACTION DATE Auqust 26, 1987 AGENDA SECTION NQ P&Z Interviews ORIGINATING DEPARTMENT Administration APPR~VE~OR AGEN"A f "- BY: II V ITEM NO. BY: Vicki Volk The following interviews for the Planning Commission have been scheduled: Harold Sullivan 7:00 P.M. Rebecca Pease 7:15 P.M. I spoke to Bill Bernard and he is anxious to serve on the Commission. MOTION BY TO COUNCIL ACTION SECOND BY o 'C i;)- "'- o o H..lgUst 11, 1987 Ci ty of Andover clo City Clerk 1685 Crosstcw1 Blvd. I\W A-tdover, t1innesota ::,.'::i.J>4 Dear City Council Members: I am applying for cne of yeur '...."'D3rlcies en the Pla_Clning and Zoning Ccmnissicn.. t.;.,' primar.l rea~on for interest in this area is th.~:t in order to continue to g~ A-tdover in 2. reasone.bl y organized manner proper planning llLISt occur now. A-1dov-er is a growing camunity--and fast. We moved into our home 1 1/2 years ago after OWling the lot for a few years prior to this. I have noticed the t-uge increase in t"Dusing starts and businesses during this time. Ccmrunities, as well as tusinesses, need ton plan ahead and be pruactiv-e instead of reactive. I believe that my e>:perience will help in the planning of OLlr c:cmJU"1i ty . My e:.:perience and e;.:pertise include the following: * CPA certification * Product develDfIDE"lt accounting consultant * Department manager of Open Syst9.~, Inc. for 4 y-ears * PrevioJS t---.....isiness. e>~p-=:ier:ce inclLtded Control Data. and Lhivac * &tsiness o..--ner and frk?.:!2ger of s'n3.11 retail shop in Cocn Rapids for 7 years * r~nse in 9~siness h~miri5tr2tic~/Hcco~~ting from Lhiversity of Minnesota *' Degree in !"'.athematics 2nd BiolCX;y fran t12ry'"ount College ~.. Kansas *' High sctuol math and sc~ence teacher ~n St. LOLlis If YCH have any questions. plea.52 ccntact me. Yours truly, e~a{1~ ~12-<l'./ R:;S;:: L. Pease ~'oo 152nd Lane f\.I.-J ?:ndO\r-er ~ I":h. SS::::.(k4 I-bme phone 427-1845 W::J,k prone 8:::'9-1458 o CITY OF ANDOVER REQUEST FOR COUNCIL ACTION DATE Auqust 26, 1987 Administration FOR ORIGINATING DEPARTMENT ITEM NO. BY: Vicki Volk BY: Attached is information regarding a new copy machine and postage meter, both from Pitney-Bowes. We recently had the copy machine at City Hall for demonstration purposes and everyone who used it was impressed with it. The copier I would recommend would be the one listed as System II. Our present copy machine was intended for a company that makes up to 3,000 copies per month. Our average per month since the first of the year is 15,000 copies. The postage meter that would best serve our needs is shown as System IV. This meter includes a 5 pound electronic scale, which would be helpful as our scale is no longer accurate, having been dropped on the floor many times. * Mr. Schrantz has the information on the telephone system. *I was told that 20% of the money used for postage is wasted due to faulty scales. COUNCIL ACTION MOTION BY TO SECOND BY ~'.\ :. o ~I~ ~~~~?~es August 12, 1987 Victoria Volk Ci ty of Andover 1605 Crosstown Boulevard Anoka MN 55303 Dear Victoria: System I D640 Copier with automatic feed, sorter, stand, set-up supplies, training, delivery, and 90 day warranty. Purchase Rental (includes service and 15,000 copies per month) $7,870.00 $711.00/Month overage - $.011 Lease (own equipment at lease end - no buyout) 36 Month Lease $310.00 Month $ 2 6 1. 00 Mo nth $230.00 Month 48 Month Lease 60 Month Lease "'-J System II D640 Copier with automatic feed, sorter, duplexing, stand, set-up supplies, training, delivery, and 90 day warranty. Purchase Rental (includes service and 15,000 copies per month) $8,975.00 $446.00/Month overage - $.011 /fr; Lease (own equipment at lease end - no buyout) o 36 Month Lease $356.00 Month 48 Month Lease $299.00 Month 60 Month Lease $262.00 Month 8161 Normandale Blvd. Minneapolis, MN 55437-1087 612835-2221 ",\-. i;ili o ~ Pitney Bowes Service 15,000 copies x 9 months = 135,000 copies 135,000 (less 90 day warranty) x .0114/per copy Point of sale first year discount $1,539.00 10% $1,385.10 15,000 copies x 12 months = divided by 180,000 copies .0077/per copy System I Peripherals $26.00 x 9 months = $234.00 Point of sale first year discount 10% $210.60 per year System II Peripherals $36.00 x 9 months = $324.00 Point of sales first year discount - 10% $291.60 per year Supplies Includes printpowder and developer $.005171""7 o o o ~ ~ Pitney Bowes System I 6264 Roll Tape Semi Automatic Mail Machine interfaced to a 5820 5 Pound Electronic Scale, priced with 1831 Folder. $161.00/Month System II Above system with no folder. $128.00/Month System III 6262 Strip Tape Semi Automatic Mail Machine interfaced to 5820 5 Pound Electronic Scale, priced with 1831 Folder. $145.00/Month ""l Sys tern IV Above system with no folder. $111.00/Month Government meter rental is a flat rate of $46.17 per month billed quarterly or annually. Meter reset charge of $6.00 Pricing includes trade in 5830 Sealer. Monthly Maintenance 6264 Mail Machine 6262 Mail Machine 5820 Scale 1831 Folder System System I I I 16 11 9 9 12 12 Yearly Maintenance 6264 6262 5820 1831 175 122 90 130 o ~ Pitney Bowes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. ll. 12. -, 13. 14. o 6264 Semi Automatic Mailing Machine Feeds 40-60 pieces per minute. Medium volume (lower end) mail machine Feeds post card size to manila envelopes. Roll tape. True sealing machine. Tape brush unit is removeable for self maintenance. Auto on/auto off. Continuous run mode. Seal/no seal control. Ink cartridge up to 30,000 impressions. Positive envelope shipment control. Water level indicator. RMRS meter compliments mail machine. Interface to electronic scales and accounting systems. ',"<.'< ~- " o o 8~~ EMS-5 POUND SCALE 1. EMS-5 Pound Electronic Scale weighs envelopes and packages up to 5 pounds. 2. Interfaces to Pitney Bowes mail machine to control operator error and prompt mail machine to change meter to proper postage and or produce a tape for a parcel. 3. Color coded for quick easy operation with association. 4. Rate shop with First Class/Priority Mail, International Third Fourth Class, Special Delivery, Return Receipt, Certified, Registered and Insured Mail. 5. Able to add Express Mail rates if needed. 6. Converts Zip-to-Zone automatically. 7. Operator is able to easily and quickly change PROMs to meet new postal rates. 8. Remains in desired class unless change is prompted by operator (no need to program class wanted for each piece of weighed mail)l o .~~ Benefits of Leasing Pitney Bowes Credit Corporation is designed to offer you unique benefits. The lease provides maximum flexibility to make immediate use of the proposed equipment while allowing you to change equipment as either needs or technology change. An Equipment Replacement Option is available that releases you from the last six monthly payments should you elect to replace your equipment at that time. Leasing affords the ability to acquire a complete system with only a minimum initial investment, thereby allowing your company to take advantage of the total benefits of the proposed system. The PBCC lease offers you one source responsibility. On a single invoice you can include any or all of the following: equipment cost for one or more leases, Equipment Maintenance Agreement cost, or your internal purchase order numbers or identification codes. Thus, your administrative cost is reduced and bookkeeping is convenient. Leasing allows you to conserve your company's cash. be used for other investments. It can then Leasing provides a hedge against inflation. Our fixed lease payments protect you against inflationary increases. Leasing also preserves your company's credit line. With leasing, equipment can be acquired without tying up your credit line. Leasing provides effective budget management since equipment and maintenance costs remain constant throughout the term. A State and Local Government lease follows all Minnesota regulations including the following: customer has the right to cancel the lease if a new budget does not permit funding of the equipment and the customer has no buyout at the end of the lease. -